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Abstract
An econometric or statistical model may undergo a marginal gain when a new
variable is admitted, and marginal loss if an existing variable is removed. The
value of a variable to the model is quantified by its expected marginal gain and
marginal loss. Under a prior belief that all candidate variables should be treated
fairly, we derive a few formulas which evaluate the overall performance of each
variable. One formula is identical to that for the Shapley value. However, it
is not symmetric with respect to marginal gain and marginal loss; moreover,
the Shapley value favors the latter. Thus we propose a unbiased solution. Two
empirical studies are included: the first being a multi-criteria model selection
for a dynamic panel regression; the second being an analysis of effect on hourly
wage given by additional years of schooling.
Keywords: unbiased multivariate Shapley value, variable selection,
marginal effect, endowment bias, model uncertainty
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1. Introduction
The problem with which we are concerned relates to the following typical
situation: When modeling data, we attempt to use a formula to simplify the
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underlying process that has been operating to produce the data. To be useful,
the model should not only help us to better understand the underlying structure5
of the variables in the past, but also be predictive in a non-specific situation in
the future; ideally, it should perform well under multiple criteria. In general, the
variables may either correlate with or be interdependent on each other. Some
variables may even be explained by other variables; thus, they are highly super-
fluous. Others may simply be irrelevant to the underlying process. Selection of10
right variables in modeling and forecasting the underlying process is one of the
most fundamental problems in statistics and econometrics.
In this paper, we incorporate rather than ignore model uncertainty and
derive a few formulas to be used in variable selection, by evaluating the contri-
bution of each variable in a large set of modeling scenarios . The exposition is15
self-contained and the approach employed is game-theoretic and Bayesian. For
a simple context, let Y denote the dependent variables in the model, and let the
universal of candidate explanatory variables be indexed by N = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
We use “i” for the singleton set {i} and “\” for set subtraction. For any set
T ⊆ N , let |T | denote the cardinality of T , and let v(T ) be a vector of collec-20
tive performance measures when we model the data Y using all variables in T .
In particular, for the empty set ∅, v(∅) is the performance measures when the
model does not involve any variables in N ; say, for example, when modeling Y
by a constant or a linear trend. The performance measures could be a measure
of model fit, variance explained, predictive power, negative of the cost function,25
probability of avoiding fatal errors, or any combination of the above.
For a given performance function v : 2N → Rm, our goal is to find a small
set of variables that have high importance with respect to v. Unlike many
algorithm-based approaches, which search for a subset of variables with optimal
collective performance, we directly evaluate the overall performance of each30
variable under a fair prior belief. Then, we use their performance to select
variables and institute the model. The search for a single model, however,
ignores the model uncertainty. By the term “overall performance,” we mean
the average performance in all possible modeling scenarios, not in a specific
2
model. Thus, a prior belief or distribution is required to specify the possibility35
of modeling scenarios; in this sense, our approach is also Bayesian and uses
model averaging (e.g., George and McCulloch, 1997; Clyde and George, 2004;
O’Hara and Sillanpaa, 2009). Given special classes of priors, we show that the
expected performance coincides with the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value
in the coalitional game (N, v). We also suggest a new value concept which40
embraces both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value.
The results in this paper arise from considering any marginal effect to be
either a marginal loss or a marginal gain. As an example, consider the con-
tribution of a bachelor’s degree (hereinafter “BD”) to the annual income of an
individual aged 40. The individual may have a BD or not. For an individual45
with a BD, a marginal gain is computed as the difference between his current
annual income and his estimated annual income, assuming he had no BD, ce-
teris paribus. On the other hand, a marginal loss for an individual with no
BD is computed as the difference between his current annual income and his
estimated annual income, assuming he had a BD, ceteris paribus. We note that50
the possession of a BD is interwoven with other factors, such as his profession
and length of relevant work experience, which also affect his income. We define
the value of a BD as the expected marginal gain and marginal loss, incorporat-
ing the ownership uncertainty and the interdependence with other factors. In
addition, a BD holder may show some endowment bias, valuing the BD more55
than those who don’t have a BD; we define the bias as the expected difference
between the marginal gain and loss.
Our research here is closely related with the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
Recently, the use of the Shapley value in modeling data has gained popularity
(e.g., Lipovetsky and Conklin, 2001; Israeli, 2007; Gromping, 2007; Devicienti,60
2010; Budina et al., 2015), partly owing to its simplicity and generality. The
vast literature also provides us with many variations on the Shapley value (cf
Donderer and Samet, 2002; Winter, 2002). Our research here provides not only
a new proof and a new interpretation of the Shapley value, but also a theoretical
foundation for properly using the value concept in variable selection and related65
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fields. Theorem 1 in this paper was previously proved in Hu(2002); the first
two theorems of this paper are a generalization of the results in Hu (2006) in
which the grand cooperation is not necessary and v(T ) is a binary function
representing a vote passing or blocking by the voters of T .
The advantage of our approach is fivefold. First, the performance measure-70
ment v is a vector function and thus extends the Shapley value to the mul-
tivariate case. As a consequence, the variable selection eventually becomes a
multi-criteria decision analysis, mitigating the discrepancy between model ac-
curacy and usefulness. Secondly, we acknowledge the model uncertainty and
the inter-linking among the variables; we address them using a prior distribu-75
tion or prior belief. Any further specifications or restrictions can also be added
to the priors. Thirdly, by dichotomizing the marginal effect, we generalize the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value under a same framework; they differ in
prior uniform distributions. Next, we discover the symmetry in the Banzhaf
value and asymmetry in the Shapley value and suggest a simple adjustment to80
be used in the applications. Lastly, under the same framework we introduce
a new valuation solution based on binomial distributions. It is as tractable in
expression and calculation as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value; addi-
tionally, it allows the expected model size from the prior to be consistent with
the model being estimated. Moreover, it has a constant endowment bias ratio85
and relates to all other value concepts discussed in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the essential ideas
of dichotomized marginal effect and relate them to the Shapley value and the
Banzhaf value. Next, sections 3 analyzes the difference, called endowment bias,
between the expectations of marginal gain and marginal loss. In this section,90
a weighted unbiased value concept is proposed. After that, section 4 discusses
how to implement the basic ideas by a sequential algorithm. In section 5, we
conduct two empirical studies. In section 6, we relate this framework to several
other topics in economics, finance, and statistics. Proofs and large tables are
contained in the Appendix.95
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2. Evaluation of Candidate Predictors
To address the model uncertainty, let the random set S ⊆ N be the set
of variables in the model. The randomness of S arises from both objective
uncertainty and subjective one. For the objective uncertainty, an econometric or
statistical model is merely an approximation and simplification of reality − Box100
(1976) even claimed that all models are wrong − and there could be many good
approximations under various criteria. For the subjective uncertainty, we do not
know exactly which specific variables to choose before performing a selection
analysis; we may have a class of subjective probabilities for it, derived from our
personal judgment, opinions, past experience, or even fairness assumptions.105
Let µ be the distribution of S with P
T
being the probability of S = T .
Without any specific prior knowledge, we have no reason to believe that one
set of candidate variables is more likely to be S than another set of the same
size. That is, we should not discriminate between sets of variables having the
same size. To put it in another way, given the size of S, we have no reason to110
select one variable and reject another. This argument is formally justified by
the principle of insufficient reason and defines a class of distributions:
F def= {µ|P
T
is a function depending only on the size of T}.
For the indeterminate S, we could add one variable from N \S to the model
or we could remove an existing variable from the model. The worth of the115
addition or removal can be explained by the variable’s marginal effect to v(S).
There are two different scenarios:
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• Scenario 1: i ∈ S. Then, i’s marginal effect is v(S) − v(S \ i), called
marginal gain, in that it contributes v(S)−v(S\ i) when we include it
into the model. The expected marginal gain, due to i’s participation
in S, is
γi[v;µ]
def
= E
[
v(S)− v(S \ i)] .
• Scenario 2: i 6∈ S. Then, the marginal effect is v(S∪ i)− v(S) in that
S faces a marginal loss or opportunity cost v(S ∪ i) − v(S) without
variable i in the model. In other words, the ith variable could have
increased the collective performance by v(S∪i)−v(S) if we had added
it to S. The expected marginal loss, due to i’s absence from S, is then
λi[v;µ]
def
= E
[
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] .
In either case, the marginal effect of i to v(S) can be written as v(S∪i)−v(S\i).
Combining these marginals, we define variable i’s dichotomous value ψi[v;µ]120
(hereinafter, “D-value”), as a functional function of v, by its expected marginal
effect under the distribution µ:
ψi[v;µ]
def
= γi[v;µ] + λi[v;µ]. (1)
Equivalently,
ψi[v;µ]
def
= E
[
v(S ∪ i)− v(S \ i)] . (2)
In other words, the D-value ψi[v;µ] quantifies variable i’s overall performance
in v under the distribution µ, which itself specifies the likelihood of modeling125
scenarios. Formally, one could derive (2) from two axioms:
• Marginality: given P
T
= 1, ψi[v;µ] = v(T ∪ i)− v(T \ i);
• Linearity: for any µ1, µ2 on 2N and any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
ψ[v;αµ1 + (1− α)µ2] = αψ[v;µ1] + (1− α)ψ[v;µ2].
Besides, one of our objectives is to apply the D-value ψ[v;µ] to distribute
the total collective performance v(N)− v(∅) among all candidate variables; this
6
requires that µ satisfies the functional equation of130
n∑
i=1
ψi[v;µ] = v(N)− v(∅). (3)
Thus, the portion ψi[v;µ] of v(N)−v(∅) is explained by variable i. The following
theorem relates the D-value ψ[v;µ] with the Shapley value Ψ[v] in the coalitional
game (N, v), defined as:
Ψi[v]
def
=
∑
T⊆N
(|T | − 1)!(n− |T |)!
n!
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)] .
Theorem 1. For any µ ∈ F which satisfies (3), we have ψ[v;µ] = Ψ[v] and
P
T
=
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!
(n+ 1)!
+ (−1)|T |η (4)
for any η which guarantees the non-negativity of all P
T
’s.
Corollary 1. If P
T
is as in (4), then µ ∈ F and ψ[v;µ] = Ψ[v].
In deriving the proofs, we assume neither v(∅) = 0, nor monotonicity of v,
nor superadditivity of v (i.e., v(X ∪Y ) ≥ v(X) +v(Y ) for any disjoint X and Y135
in N). As shown by (4), µ is not even unique. Besides, in the benchmark prior
with η = 0, |S| has the uniform distribution on the integers 0, 1, · · · , n.
In the game theory literature, there is another value concept called the
Banzhzf value b[v] (Banzhaf, 1965) which is defined as
bi[v]
def
=
1
2n−1
∑
T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)] .
In the next theorem, we associate the Banzhaf value with the D-value ψ[v;µ]
through another benchmark distribution, the uniform distribution on 2N .
Theorem 2. ψ[v;µ] = b[v] if and only if P
T
= 12n + (−1)|T |η for some η with140
|η| ≤ 12n .
In this benchmark distribution (with η = 0), the model size |S| has a binomial
distribution with parameters n and .5. Note that in both benchmark distribu-
tions, the model S has an expected size n2 , which could be highly unrealistic,
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especially when applied in big data analytics. To solve the puzzle, we may use145
priors with nonzero η in which the density function P
T
oscillates with the size
|T |; we could also consider other distributions for |S|.
Theorem 3. If µ ∈ F and |S| has a distribution of Binomial(n, p), then
P
T
= p|T |(1− p)n−|T |
and
ψi[v;µ] =
1
pγi[v;µ] =
1
1−pλi[v;µ]
=
∑
T
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T | [v(T )− v(T \ i)] . (5)
In the binomial distribution, the model S has an expected size of np.
3. Endowment Bias150
In our valuation paradigm, we classify two types of marginal effect according
to the ownership: i ∈ S or i 6∈ S. In practice, people tend to value more on
things they own, rather than ones they do not own − even when things are
exchangeable in value. This subjective bias is called the endowment effect or
endowment bias. In this section, we first define the bias and then analyze the155
implied bias in the Shapley value and the Banzhf value.
For i, we define its endowment bias as the difference between its expected
marginal gain and its expected marginal loss,
κi[v;µ]
def
= γi[v;µ]− λi[v;µ].
Lemma 1 provides a method to calculate biases directly without involving the
expected marginal gain or loss.
Lemma 1. κi[v;µ] =
∑
T
[
2P
T
− P
T∪i
− P
T\i
]
v(T ).
In Lemma 1, the weights of v(T )’s sum to zero; but the bias itself may be not.160
The following two theorems indicate strong association between the endowment
unbiasedness and the Banzhaf value.
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Theorem 4. The endowment bias κ[v;µ] = 0 if and only if µ is the uniform
distribution on 2N , the benchmark distribution for the Banzhaf value.
Theorem 5. Given µ ∈ F , the total bias ∑
i
κi[v;µ] = 0 if and only if µ is the165
uniform distribution on 2N .
The Shapley value, however, tends to demonstrate strong evidence of nega-
tive endowment bias, largely due to the diminishing marginal effect of v. This
counterintuitive issue could bring the users undesirable inference from the data
and eventually limits the usage of the value. When v is a set of modeling crite-170
ria, in general, the candidate variables are modestly correlated with each other;
as a consequence, for any i 6∈ T , its explanatory and predictive power is par-
tially mitigated by the members of T . Moreover, the larger the set T , the likely
more the mitigation; thus, superaddtivity assumption is highly artificial, and
diminishing marginality is more pervasive.175
Figure 1: Diminishing Marginal Effect for a Typical Set T
Let us formally define the diminishing marginality. Ideally, we expect the
inequality
v(T )− v(T \ i) ≥ v(T ∪ j)− v(T )
holds for a typical T , i ∈ T and j 6∈ T as in Figure 1. But it is laborious to
locate the typical T and it is impractical for the inequality to hold for all T ’s.
Thus, we average both sides of the inequality for all T ’s of size t, all i ∈ T and
all j 6∈ T . Obviously, the averages are
ωt
def
= (t−1)!(n−t)!n!
∑
|T |=t
∑
i∈T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)], t = 1, 2, · · · , n;
pit
def
= t!(n−t−1)!n!
∑
|T |=t
∑
j 6∈T
[v(T ∪ j)− v(T )], t = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
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We say v has diminishing marginal effect if ωt ≥ pit for t = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1; we
also say v has diminishing marginal gain (or diminishing marginal loss) if ωt
(or pit, respectively) is a decreasing function of t.
Theorem 6. pit = ωt+1 for t = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. Consequently, the following
statements are equivalent: 1. v has diminishing marginal effect; 2. v has di-180
minishing marginal gain; 3. v has diminishing marginal loss.
Theorem 7. Assume P
T
= (|T |)!(n−|T |)!(n+1)! , the benchmark prior for the Shapley
value. If v has diminishing marginal effect, then
n∑
i=1
κi[v;µ] ≤ 0; if v is super-
additive, then
n∑
i=1
κi[v;µ] ≥ 0.
In an objective valuation, such as variable selection, either positive or neg-185
ative endowment bias should be avoided. In (1), we place the same weight on
the marginal loss as on the marginal gain. To mitigate the endowment bias, one
could study the unbiased D-value defined as
ψ˜i[v;µ]
def
= (1− α)γi[v;µ] + (1 + α)λi[v;µ]. (6)
where α =
∑
j
κj [v;µ]∑
j
ψj [v;µ]
, called endowment bias ratio, is the ratio between the total
endowment bias and the total D-value. Clearly, there is no more endowment
bias in the unbiased D-value:∑
i
(1− α)γi[v;µ]−
∑
i
(1 + α)λi[v;µ]
=
∑
i
(γi[v;µ]− λi[v;µ])− α
∑
i
(γi[v;µ] + λi[v;µ]) = 0.
Figure 2: The Endowment Bias Ratio
In general, the endowment bias ratio α lies between −1 and 1 when v is190
a monotonic function. If α is close to 0, then there is no endowment bias. If
10
α is significantly positive, then
∑
j
γj [v;µ] >
∑
j
λj [v;µ] and we have positive
endowment bias; we should place more weights on the expected marginal loss.
In contrast, if α is significantly negative, then we have negative endowment bias
and we should place more weights on the expected marginal gain.195
Theorem 8. If µ ∈ F and the size |S| has a distribution of Binomial(n, p),
then the endowment bias ratio α = 2p− 1 and the unbiased D-value is
ψ˜i[v;µ] = 4(1− p)γi[v;µ] = 4pλi[v;µ] = 4p(1− p)ψi[v;µ]
= 4
∑
T
p|T |(1− p)n−|T |+1[v(T )− v(T \ i)].
If p itself is random and has a Beta(s, t) distribution, we marginalize out p
in (5); the result is the expected D-value:
Eψi[v;µ] =
∑
T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)] 1β(s,t) ∫ 10 p|T |−1+s−1(1− p)n−|T |+t−1dp
=
∑
T
β(s+|T |−1,t+n−|T |)
β(s,t)
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
(7)
In this generalization, β(·, ·) is the beta function and the model S has an ex-
pected size of nE[p] = nss+t . Likewisely, by Theorem 8, the expected unbiased
D-value is200
Eψ˜i[v;µ] = 4
∑
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] 1β(s,t)
∫ 1
0
p|T |+s−1(1− p)n−|T |+1+t−1dp
= 4
∑
T
β(s+|T |,t+n−|T |+1)
β(s,t)
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
(8)
As a special case, when s = t = 1 (i.e. p has the uniform distribution on [0, 1]),
then (7) reduces to the Shapley value Ψi[v] and consequently, (8) becomes its
unbiased one as stated in Theorem 9.
Theorem 9. The unbiased Shapley value is given by
Ψ˜i[v] = 4
∑
T
(|T |)!(n− |T |+ 1)!
(n+ 2)!
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
In a subjective valuation, such as evaluating a used car, we need to consider
a second layer of risk: the uncertainty in v(T∪i)−v(T ) and v(T )−v(T \i) differs205
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and the former one is far more significant than the latter one. Consequently, a
positive α is more likely for a risk-averse evaluator. This partially explains the
vast existence of positive endowment bias.
4. Estimation
For a large n, exact calculation of the D-value ψ[v;µ] is not practical; thus210
we seek random sampling techniques to approximate it. An easy way to ap-
proximate the D-value ψ[v;µ] and its components by random sampling is to
randomly draw many S’s and then apply the definition of D-value. For a large
n, however, some members in N could be much less represented in these S’s
than other members. In this section we study instead a random ordering in215
which each member appears exactly once and then calculate added value for
all members in the ordering. Finally we average the added values from a large
number of random orderings to estimate ψ[v;µ] and its components.
Let Ω be the set of orderings of all candidate variables. There are n! orderings
in total. We randomly take an ordering τ from Ω:
τ : ∅ → i1 → · · · → i→ · · · → in.
Let Ξτi be the set of variables in N which precede i in the ordering τ , and let
φτi = v(Ξ
τ
i ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ).
Shapley(1953) showed that E[φτi ] = Ψi[v] where the expectation is taken under
the premise that any ordering is equally likely to be picked from Ω. To estimate
γ[v;µ], λ[v;µ], and ψ[v;µ] for any µ, we bind the probability density to the
sequential increments by letting
φ˜τi
def
=
(P
Ξτ
i
+ P
Ξτ
i
∪i)n!
(|Ξτi |)!(n− |Ξτi | − 1)!
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi )
]
.
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Theorem 10. E[φ˜τi ] = ψi[v;µ] where τ has a uniform distribution on Ω. Fur-220
thermore,
γi[v;µ] = E
[
n!P
Ξτ
i
∪i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)!
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ))
]
,
λi[v;µ] = E
[ n!P
Ξτ
i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)!
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ))
]
.
(9)
In particular, the Shapley value can be decomposed into two parts
γi[v;µ] = E
[ |Ξτi |+1
n+1
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ))
]
,
λi[v;µ] = E
[
n−|Ξτi |
n+1
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ))
]
.
(10)
and the unbiased Shapley value equals
Ψ˜i[v] = 4E
[
(|Ξτi |+ 1)(n− |Ξτi |)
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)− v(Ξτi ))
]
. (11)
To estimate these values, we take a large sample of orderings from Ω. Then
we use the average of φi’s in the sample to estimate Ψi[v], use the average225
of φ˜i’s in the sample to estimate ψi[v;µ], and use (9) and (10) to estimate
expected marginal gain and loss. The averages converge as the sample size
increases, according to the large sample theories. The sampling error reduces as
the sample size increases; its size is asymptotically approximated by the Central
Limit Theorem. Additionally, we can extract the medians, confidence intervals,230
and other robust statistics from the large sample of sequential marginal gain.
The sequential approach implied by Theorem 10 is different from the classical
stepwise procedures in regression. In the sequential approach, we average the
changed v from directly nested models. The stepwise procedure admits and
drops variables based on their significance test; however, the exact significance235
level cannot be calculated (cf Freedom, 1983). As a matter of fact, because of
the diminishing marginality, variable i’s significance tends to become smaller
as the size of Ξτi increases; consequently, different procedures or starting from
different models could lead to different selected models; thus stepwise procedures
are sub-optimal. Another drawback of this procedure is that it heavily relies on240
a single criterion, such as the F -statistic.
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When the model size |S| has a distribution of Binomial(n, p), the estimated
model Sˆ certainly depends on the choice of p; meanwhile, we can also estimate
p from an estimated model Sˆ using the relation E[|S|] = np. Thus, we could
estimate both S and p recursively and iteratively by the following algorithm:245
Step 1: use a non-informative prior, such as the benchmark distribution
for the Shapley value or the Banzhaf value to estimate a Sˆ;
Step 2: estimate p using pˆ = |Sˆ|n ;
Step 3: use Binomial(n, pˆ) as the prior to estimate a new Sˆ;
Step 4: repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until pˆ converges.
If the algorithm does not converge, then an extended algorithm called MCMC
(Markov chain Monte Carlo) can be used to estimate the posterior distribution
of (p,S).
5. Empirical Studies250
Our approach opens new areas of applications and suggests improvement on
how to apply the Shapley value. In this section, we first attempt to solve a vari-
able selection problem using a multi-criteria decision analysis based on unbiased
multivariate Shapley value. We then extend the above binary categorization to
ternary to calculate the effect of one or more schooling years on the hourly wage.255
5.1. Unbiased Multivariate Shapley Value Analysis of Model Selection
In this empirical study, we analyze the employment-related data in Arellano
and Bond (1991) for 140 U.K. firms from 1976 to 1984. The objective is to model
the employment size using a set of possible explanatory variables, including up260
to 2 lags of both the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The
variables are:
Ei,t : log of employment in company i at the end of year t,
Wi,t : log of real product wage in company i at the end of year t,
Ki,t : log of gross capital in company i at the end of year t,
Yi,t : log of industry output in company i at the end of year t.
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In this example, Ei,t is the dependent variable; there are 11 candidate explana-
tory variables: Ei,t−1, Ei,t−2, Wi,t, Wi,t−1, Wi,t−2, Ki,t, Ki,t−1, Ki,t−2, Yi,t,265
Yi,t−1, and Yi,t−2. Thus, there are totally 211 = 2048 potential models. Let all
models also contain a common intercept, a time effect that is common to all
companies, a permanent but unobservable firm-specific effect, and an error term.
The models are estimated by the GMM method with all candidate variables and
the constant intercept as the instruments.270
Let the measurement function v(T ) be 5-dimensional. The first component
is the goodness of fit, measured by the R-squared when modeling Ei,t by the
variables in T . The second and third components are its significance when a
new variable is admitted to S, using its squared t-statistic and absolute value
of t-statistic, respectively. The fourth and fifth components are the predictive275
measure, using the mean squared error when the model of T is used for dynamic
and static forecasts, respectively. Alternative criteria, such as the log likelihood,
F-statistic, Theil-U2, etc, can also be used.
From the 11! total orderings of the independent variables, we randomly sam-
ple 5, 000. For each ordering τ , we run stepwise regressions from the emptyset280
∅ to the grand coalition N to get the scaled marginal gain and scaled marginal
loss in the ordering, using (10). Averaging these 5, 000 scaled marginal gains
and scaled marginal losses, we obtain the estimated γˆi[v;µ] and λˆi[v;µ]. Finally,
we estimate the Shapley value by Ψˆi[v] = γˆi[v;µ] + λˆi[v;µ] and the unbiased
Shapley value by formula (6). In Tables 2 and 3, we report both the original285
and the unbiased multivariate Shapley value, as well as its percentage share in
the parenthesis. Estimated endowment bias ratio αˆ is in the last row of Table
3.
Based on these two tables, we definitely need to keep the variables Ei,t−1,
Ki,t, and Ki,t−1. They perform significantly well under all 5 criteria. Five other290
variables, Ei,t−2, Wi,t, Wi,t−2, Ki,t−2, and Yi,t−2, perform well under some, but
not all criteria. For parsimony purpose, we should drop Wi,t−1, Yi,t, and Yi,t−1.
Thus, the final model consists of the explanatory variables Ei,t−1, Ki,t, Ki,t−1,
Ei,t−2, Wi,t, Wi,t−2, Ki,t−2, and Yi,t−2. Mathematically speaking, the decision
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rule is to drop a variable if its percentage shares are less than 5% in all 5 criteria.295
The estimation results in Table 3 shows strong evidence of negative endow-
ment bias for the model fit criterion, and even larger negative endowment bias
for the predictive criteria. We also find that the employment rigidity, indicated
by Ei,t−1, is the most important factor in determining the employment size. In
addition, one could reasonably argue that the employment size largely depends300
on the gross capital (both prevailing and 1-year lagged), and barely relies on
the prevailing wage and the 2-year lagged industrial output.
5.2. Worth of Additional Schooling Years
In this study, we extend the idea of dichotomy to trichotomize the marginal305
effect and answer a question extensively studied: by how much would a higher
level of education likely raise one’s hourly pay rate. There are of course many
other factors which also affect the hourly income. To remove the effect of a
worker’s natural ability, his family background, and his innate intelligence on in-
come, we analyze the Twinsburg schooling data in Ashenfelter and Krueger(1994)310
and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998).
The data contains several income-related variables for 340 pairs of identical
twins. For simplicity, we only assume that marriage status and union coverage,
besides educational level, also affect one’s income. For each pair of twins, we
randomly name them “Type 1” and “Type 2”; thus, we create a randomized
dataset. For any randomized dataset, let us categorize the ith pair of twins by
introducing the union coverage variable U , the marriage status variable M , and
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the educational level variable E, defined as
Ui =

−1, if Type 2 has union coverage but Type 1 hasn’t;
1, if Type 1 has union coverage but Type 2 hasn’t;
0, otherwise.
Mi =

−1, if Type 2 is married but Type 1 isn’t;
1, if Type 1 is married but Type 2 isn’t;
0, otherwise.
Ei =

−1, if Type 2 has one or more additional schooling years than Type 1;
1, if Type 1 has one or more additional schooling years than Type 2;
0, otherwise.
Accordingly, we classify the 340 observations into 27 categories, some of
which may contain no observations. For Table 4, the data is actually not ran-
domized: we label Type 1 twins before Type 2 twins according to their orders
in the original data. Column 2 lists the frequency for each category of (U,M,E)315
in Column 1.
Our purpose is to quantify the income differential due to the schooling dif-
ferential only, U and M remaining unchanged. Let v(U,M,E) be the average
difference of hourly wages between Type 1 twins and Type 2 twins in the cat-
egory (U,M,E). The difference comes from the values of U,M,E, as well as
sampling error. Column 3 of Table 4 lists the v for the non-randomized dataset.
For the category (U,M, 1), the marginal gain and effect is v(U,M, 1)−v(U,M, 0);
the effect is only due to the difference in Ei, plus a random error. For the cat-
egory (U,M,−1), the marginal loss and effect is v(U,M, 0)− v(U,M,−1). For
the category (U,M, 0), the marginal gain is v(U,M, 0) − v(U,M,−1) and the
marginal loss is v(U,M, 1) − v(U,M, 0); we average them for calculating the
marginal effect, i.e.
[v(U,M, 0)− v(U,M,−1)] + [v(U,M, 1)− v(U,M, 0)]
2
=
v(U,M, 1)− v(U,M,−1)
2
.
The last three columns of Table 4 list the marginal gain, loss, and effect for the
non-randomized dataset. The last row is the weighted marginal gain, loss and
effect weighted by the frequencies. For example, the weighted marginal effect is
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calculated as:[
1(−11.791) + 2(−3.4492) + · · ·+ 2(4.7643) + 1(−.2133)
]
/338 = 2.7995.
Repeating the above calculations for a large number of randomized datasets,
we obtain a large set of frequency-weighted marginal gain, loss and effect, due
to one or more years of schooling. Given the average hourly wage $14.44 in
1993, we find that both mean and median wage increase is about 18.3%. The320
results are consistent with, though slightly lower than, those from the marginal
gain and marginal loss. The statistics are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Marginal Gain, Loss and Effect of 1+ Years of Schooling (in %, except α)
Mean Median Std. Dev .95 Confidence Band
marginal effect 18.2879 18.2833 1.30667 [15.8921, 20.7155]
marginal gain 18.8138 18.7626 4.30053 [10.5990, 27.2509]
marginal loss 18.7867 18.7543 4.28981 [10.5758, 27.1039]
bias ratio α .001343 .000459 .448105 [-.864527, .867927]
Figure 3: Multi-modal Effects of Additional Schooling Years on Wage
Though the estimated endowment bias ratio has slightly positive mean and
median, it is not significantly different from zero, showing no enough evidence
of endowment bias. Interestingly, the effects show a multi-modal distribution325
(Figure 3) with modes at 17.7% and 19.2%, respectively. Unlike a regression
method, our calculation allows heterogeneous effects from the other explanatory
variables − the heterogeneity significantly presents in Table 4. In addition, our
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approach addresses the asymmetric sides of the marginal effects and the non-
parametric method assumes less assumptions than a regression one. Interested330
readers can re-categorize the Ei variable to find the effects of other educational
differential.
6. Discussions, Variations, and Applications
Given the evaluation ψ˜, we select those variables with large D-value ψ˜i in
modeling the data generating process. The selected variables, however, may not335
have the best collective performance under certain criterion. The model with
the best performance under the criterion, on the other hand, does not neces-
sarily produce the best performance under other criteria. This dilemma leads
us to evaluate the variables not in one specific model context, but in modeling
scenarios specified by a prior distribution. Moreover, as a tool for multi-criteria340
decision analysis, our valuation approach seeks the balance between data fitting,
prediction, and other criteria. Depending on specific contexts, similar ideas can
be applied to other areas of economics, finance, political science, and statistics
without substantial changes.
6.1. Structural valuation345
In a real valuation situation, it could be proper to specify a context-specific
prior µ; for example, in a voting, let |S| have a uniform distribution on the
integers in bn/4, 3n/4c, rather than on the integers in [0, n]. This can also be
readily done by placing restrictions on µ; for example, if players i and j would
never cooperate in the voting, then the probability of ij ∈ S should be zero.350
Though analytic formula is unlikely available for ψ[v;µ] under a restricted µ,
Monte Carlo method is generally feasible. In the Monte Carlo simulations, we
simply ignore the restricted cases, randomly generated from Ω or a µ ∈ F .
6.2. Unemployment Compensation
Let N be the labor force (either employed or seeking for employment) of an355
economy, S be the employed, and v(T ) be the social welfare or surplus made
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collectively by T . Then, a fair and efficient rule to distribute unemployment
benefits could be the solution of ψ[v;µ] such that µ ∈ F and
n∑
i=1
ψi[v;µ] =
max
T
v(T ), instead of v(N). Under the efficiency assumption of the labor market,
the employed S is expected to maximize the social welfare of the nation; thus360
the distribution rule solves
n∑
i=1
ψi[v;µ] = E[v(S)].
Figure 4: The price is determined at the intersection of frequency plots
6.3. A Theory of Price
Consider a market of identical used cars (or a secondary market of a stock
or bond). There are two groups of market participants: potential sellers and
potential buyers. Each group has its own frequency distribution with heteroge-365
neous valuation about the car. The value of a car to the potential sellers is the
marginal gain; to the potential buyers, it is the marginal loss. In Figure 4, the
frequence plots intersect at a price where the demand quantity equals to the
supply quantity.
6.4. Power Index in a Ternary Voting System370
Let us study a ternary voting rule in which a voter has only two choices,
but v(S) has three outcomes: passed, failed, or dropped. Here S denotes the
random coalition of voters who vote for the bill.
Let τ be a random ordering of all voters. In this ordering, there is exactly
one pivotal voter i such that he changes the outcome v(Ξτi ), but N \ Ξτi \ i375
no longer changes the outcome v(Ξτi ∪ i). The chance of being pivotal in all
orderings can be used to measure one’s power in the voting system.
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6.5. Value of a Coalition Z
If N is a firm, a coalition Z could be the sales group or the R&D team.
We treat coalition Z as an indivisible entity; and there are many value-added
opportunities for Z and the rest of the firm. For a value of Z, a natural extension
to the D-value ψi is
E [v(S ∪ Z)− v(S \ Z)]
6.6. Value of Integration or M&A
Assume two disjoint firms M and N . We consider the potential integration
between M and N . To evaluate the integration, one could work from the added
value between their coalitions:
E[v(X ∪Y)− v(X)− v(Y)]
where random X ⊆ N and Y ⊆M are potential cooperating coalitions.380
6.7. Value of Substitution
If i ∈ S, then i’s position could be replaced by some other player, say j, in
N \ S. So we have the added value
v(S ∪ j \ i)− v(S).
Dually, if i 6∈ S, then i could substitute for a player, say j, in S. This
substitution gives an added value:
v(S ∪ i \ j)− v(S).
6.8. Analysis of Variance
In regressing Y on the variables in T by a linear model, we let v(T ) be the
variance of Y explained by T . Decomposition of v(N) − v(∅) by the Shapley
value provides a specific share each variable contributes to modeling Y using all385
variables in N .
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6.9. Outliers Detection
In detecting outliers observations, one could apply the D-value ψ˜i to evaluate
the overall performance of each observation. For example, consider the MCD
estimator of robust covariance (cf Rousseeuw, 1985). Among all covariances of390
subsamples of a given size, the MCD estimator has the minimum determinant.
We let N be the full sample of observations and T be a subsample. Let v(T )
be the determinant of the covariance of the subsample T . We can reasonably
assume no discrimination on any subsample among all subsamples of the same
size. A binomial(n, p) prior with p ∈ [.9, .99] could be a good choice for the size395
of non-outliers observations.
6.10. Continuous Categorization
In the empirical study of schooling years, we replace the binary classification
with an ordered ternary one. In a more generic situation, we may assume a
continuous random vector X = (X1, · · · , Xn)′ ∈ Rn and a differentiable function400
v : Rn → R. Let µ be the distribution of X. In this setting, the marginal effect
is represented by a partial derivative and the corresponding valuation of variable
Xi is
ψi[v;µ] = E
[
dv(X)
dxi
]
=
∫
(x1,···,xn)∈Rn
dv(x1, · · · , xn)
dxi
dµ (12)
in contrast with (2) and the Aumann-Shapley value (Aumann and Shapley,
1974). All interdependence, restrictions, and uncertainty assumption about X405
are contained in the distribution µ.
Given a sample of X1, · · · , Xn and the value v at the sample observations,
we may use a multivariate empirical distribution µˆ to fit the distribution µ and
apply a multivariate differentiable function vˆ to fit v. Finally, formula (12) with
µ = µˆ and v = vˆ estimates variable Xi’s relative importance in modeling Y410
with a differentiable function v.
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Appendix
For notational simplicity, we assume that v is 1-dimensional set function v :465
2N → R in the proofs.
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
For t = 0, 1, · · · , n, let δt def=
∑
|T |=t
P
T
, the probability of |S| = t. As µ ∈ F ,
P
T
= (|T |)!(n−|T |)!n! δ|T | . For any fixed i ∈ N , we write (1) as
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
P
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] + ∑
Z 63i
P
Z
[v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)]
Q=T\i
=
∑
T3i
P
T
v(T )− ∑
Q 63i
P
Q∪i
v(Q) +
∑
Z 63i
P
Z
[v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)]
=
∑
T3i
P
T
v(T ) +
∑
Z 63i
P
Z
v(Z ∪ i)− ∑
Z 63i
[P
Z
+ P
Z∪i
]v(Z)
T=Z∪i
=
∑
T3i
P
T
v(T ) +
∑
T3i
P
T\i
v(T )− ∑
Z 63i
[P
Z
+ P
Z∪i
]v(Z)
=
∑
T3i
v(T )[P
T
+ P
T\i
]− ∑
T 63i
v(T )[P
T
+ P
T∪i
].
(13)
Therefore, By (3)470
v(N)− v(∅) = ∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
T3i
v(T )[P
T
+ P
T\i
]− ∑
i∈N
∑
T 63i
v(T )[P
T
+ P
T∪i
]
=
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
i∈T
[P
T
+ P
T\i
]− ∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
i6∈T
[P
T
+ P
T∪i
]
=
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
[
|T |P
T
+
∑
i∈T
P
T\i
− (n− |T |)P
T
− ∑
i6∈T
P
T∪i
]
=
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
[
(2|T | − n)P
T
+
∑
i∈T
P
T\i
− ∑
i 6∈T
P
T∪i
]
.
(14)
We compare the coefficients of v(N) and v(∅) in (14) to get nδn + δn−1 = 1,nδ0 + δ1 = 1. (15)
For any T such that T 6= N and T 6= ∅, the coefficients of v(T ) in (14) imply
that
(2|T | − n)P
T
=
∑
i6∈T
P
T∪i
−
∑
i∈T
P
T\i
.
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Let |T | = t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1, and rewrite the above equation in terms of δ’s,
(2t− n) t!(n− t)!
n!
δ
t
= (n− t) (t+ 1)!(n− t− 1)!
n!
δ
t+1
− t (t− 1)!(n− t+ 1)!
n!
δ
t−1 .
Or simply,
(2t− n)δt = (t+ 1)δt+1 − (n− t+ 1)δt−1. (16)
By (15), (16) and
n∑
t=0
δt = 1, we have n+ 2 linear equations of n+ 1 unknowns,

n 1
n 2− n −2
n− 1 4− n −3
. . .
. . .
. . .
2 n− 2 −n
1 n
1 1 1 · · · · · · 1 1 1


δ0
δ1
δ2
...
δn−2
δn−1
δn

=

1
0
0
...
0
1
1

.
The rank of the (n + 2) × (n + 1) coefficient matrix is at least n, due to
the fact that the submatrix of the first n columns and the middle n rows has
determinant n! 6= 0. It is not hard to verify that the general solution to the475
system of equations is
δt =
1
n+ 1
+ (−1)t
 n
t
 η (17)
for some indeterminate η. Any η with |η| ≤ min
0≤s≤n
s!(n−s)!
(n+1)! =
(bn+12 c)!(n−bn+12 c)!
(n+1)!
guarantees non-negative δt’s. Thus, for any T ⊆ N ,
P
T
=
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!
(n+ 1)!
+ (−1)|T |η.
Therefore, for any T with i ∈ T ,
P
T
+ P
T\i
=
(|T | − 1)!(n− |T |)!
n!
, (18)
and for any T with i 6∈ T ,
P
T
+ P
T∪i
=
(|T |)!(n− |T | − 1)!
n!
. (19)
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Finally, we plug (18) and (19) into (13),
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! v(T )−
∑
T 63i
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)!
n! v(T )
Z=T∪i
=
∑
T3i
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! v(T )−
∑
Z3i
(|Z|−1)!(n−|Z|)!
n! v(Z \ i)
T=Z
=
∑
T⊆N
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! [v(T )− v(T \ i)] = Ψi[v].
(20)
A2. Proof of Corollary 1480
If P
T
= (|T |)!(n−|T |)!(n+1)! + (−1)|T |η, clearly µ ∈ F . Furthermore, we repeat
(18)−(20) to get ψ[v;µ] = Ψ[v].
A3. Proof of Theorem 2
If P
T
= 12n + (−1)|T |η for any T , then PT + PT\i = PT + PT∪j = 12n−1 for
any i ∈ T and any j 6∈ T . By (13),
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
1
2n−1 v(T )−
∑
T 63i
1
2n−1 v(T )
Z=T∪i
= 12n−1
∑
T3i
v(T )− 12n−1
∑
Z3i
v(Z \ i)
Z=T
= 12n−1
∑
T3i
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] = bi[v].
On the contrary, if ψ[v;µ] = b[v], then for any i,
ψi[v;µ] =
1
2n−1
∑
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] = 1
2n−1
∑
T3i
v(T )− 1
2n−1
∑
T 63i
v(T ).
By (13),  PT + PT\i = 12n−1 , for any i ∈ T ;P
T
+ P
T∪i
= 12n−1 , for any i 6∈ T.
(21)
Without loss of generality, let P∅ =
1
2n + η for some η with |η| ≤ 12n . In (21),485
let T = i and we get
P
T
=
1
2n−1
− P∅ = 1
2n
+ (−1)|T |η (22)
for any T with |T | = 1. Let us assume the above identity holds for all T ’s with
|T | = t and consider any Z with |Z| = t+ 1. Pick an i ∈ Z and apply (21),
P
Z
=
1
2n−1
− P
Z\i
=
1
2n−1
−
[
1
2n
+ (−1)tη
]
=
1
2n
+ (−1)|Z|η.
This shows (22) is also true for Z with |Z| = t+ 1. By mathematical induction,
we have proved (22) for all T ’s.
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A4. Proof of Theorem 3
If µ ∈ F and |S| has a binomial distribution with parameters n and p, then
P
T
=
δ|T | n
|T |
 =
 n
|T |
 p|T |(1− p)n−|T |
 n
|T |
 = p
|T |(1− p)n−|T |.
Next,
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
P
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] + ∑
Z 63i
P
Z
[v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)]
T=Z∪i
=
∑
T3i
P
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] + ∑
T3i
P
T\i
[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T3i
[
p|T |(1− p)n−|T | + p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |+1] [v(T )− v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T3i
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |[v(T )− v(T \ i)].
From the above, we also see
γi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
p|T |(1− p)n−|T |[v(T )− v(T \ i)] = pψi[v;µ],
λi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |+1[v(T )− v(T \ i)] = (1− p)ψi[v;µ].
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A5. Proof of Lemma 1490
κi = E
[
v(S)− v(S \ i)]− E [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)]
=
∑
T3i
P
T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)]− ∑
Z 63i
P
Z
[
v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)]
=
[∑
T3i
P
T
v(T ) +
∑
Z 63i
P
Z
v(Z)
]
− ∑
T3i
P
T
v(T \ i)− ∑
Z 63i
P
Z
v(Z ∪ i)
Q=Z∪i
=
∑
T
P
T
v(T )− ∑
T3i
P
T
v(T \ i)− ∑
Q3i
P
Q\i
v(Q)
Z=T\i
=
∑
T
P
T
v(T )− ∑
Z 63i
P
Z∪i
v(Z)−∑
Q
P
Q\i
v(Q) +
∑
Q 63i
P
Q\i
v(Q)
=
∑
T
[
P
T
− P
T\i
]
v(T )− ∑
Z 63i
P
Z∪i
v(Z) +
∑
Q63i
P
Q
v(Q)
=
∑
T
[
P
T
− P
T\i
]
v(T )−∑
Z
P
Z∪i
v(Z) +
∑
Z3i
P
Z∪i
v(Z) +
∑
Q 63i
P
Q
v(Q)
=
∑
T
[
P
T
− P
T\i
− P
T∪i
]
v(T ) +
[∑
Z3i
P
Z
v(Z) +
∑
Q63i
P
Q
v(Q)
]
=
∑
T
[
P
T
− P
T\i
− P
T∪i
]
v(T ) +
∑
T
P
T
v(T )
=
∑
T
[
2P
T
− P
T∪i
− P
T\i
]
v(T ).
A6. Proof of Theorem 4
If P
T
= 12n for any T , then 2PT − PT∪i − PT\i = 0 for any i and T . By
Lemma 1,
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T
[
2P
T
− P
T∪i
− P
T\i
]
v(T ) =
∑
T
0 ∗ v(T ) = 0.
On the contrary, if κ[v;µ] = 0, then Lemma 1 implies that 2P
T
− P
T∪i
−
P
T\i
= 0 for any i and T . We let the size of T run from 1 to n:
1. If T = i, then 2P
i
− P
i∪i
− P
i\i
= 0, showing Pi = P∅ for any i.
2. If T = ij with i 6= j, then 2P
ij
− P
ij∪i
− P
ij\i
= 0, showing P
ij
=
P
j
= P∅ for any i 6= j.
3. Let us assume that P
Z
= P∅ for any Z with |Z| = t. For any T with
|T | = t+ 1, we pick an i from T and apply the relation 2P
T
−P
T∪i
−
P
T\i
= 0, showing P
T
= P
T\i
= P∅ .
By mathematical induction, we conclude that P
T
= P∅ for any T . As
∑
T
P
T
= 1,495
P
T
= 12n .
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A7. Proof of Theorem 5
For µ ∈ F , P
T
=
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n! where δt is the probability of |S| = t. We
first simplify the total bias for µ ∈ F .∑
i
γi[v;µ] =
∑
i
∑
T3i
P
T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n!
∑
i∈T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)].∑
i
λi[v;µ] =
∑
i
∑
T 63i
P
T
[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
Z=T∪i
=
∑
i
∑
Z3i
P
Z\i
[v(Z)− v(Z \ i)]
=
∑
Z 6=∅
(|Z|−1)!(n−|Z|+1)!δ|Z|−1
n!
∑
i∈Z
[v(Z)− v(Z \ i)].
Then,∑
i
κi =
∑
T 6=∅
(|T | − 1)!(n− |T |)!(|T |δ|T | − (n− |T |+ 1)δ|T |−1)
n!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)
]
.
(23)
Thus,
∑
i
κi[v;µ] = 0 if and only if |T |δ|T | = (n − |T | + 1)δ|T |−1 for any T 6= ∅.
By induction on the size of T from 1 to n, we have
δ1 = nδ0,
δ2 =
n−1
2 δ1 =
n(n−1)
2! δ0,
δ3 =
n−2
3 δ2 =
n(n−1)(n−2)
3! δ0,
· · · · · ·
which establishes that δt =
n!
t!(n−t)!δ0 for any t ≥ 1. Finally, as
n∑
t=0
δt = 1, we
get δ0 =
1
2n ; therefore
P
T
=
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!
n!
δ|T | =
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!
n!
n!
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!δ0 =
1
2n
.
A8. Proof of Theorem 6500
By definitions,
pit =
t!(n−t−1)!
n!
∑
|T |=t,i 6∈T
[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
Z=T∪i
= ((t+1)−1)!(n−(t+1))!n!
∑
|Z|=t+1,i∈Z
[v(Z)− v(Z \ i)]
T=Z
= ((t+1)−1)!(n−(t+1))!n!
∑
|T |=t+1
∑
i∈T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)] = ωt+1.
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Therefore, ωt ≥ pit if and only if ωt ≥ ωt+1, or equivalently, ωt is a decreas-
ing function of t. In the same fashion, ωt ≥ pit if and only if pit−1 ≥ pit, or
equivalently, pit is a decreasing function of t.
A9. Proof of Theorem 7
If P
T
= (|T |)!(n−|T |)!(n+1)! and v has diminishing marginality, then
n∑
i=1
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
− ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!
(n+1)!
∑
i 6∈Z
[
v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)]
T=Z∪i
=
n∑
t=1
∑
|T |=t
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
− ∑
T 6=∅
(|T |−1)!(n+1−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)]
=
n∑
t=1
t
n+1ωt −
n∑
t=1
∑
|T |=t
(|T |−1)!(n+1−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)]
=
n∑
t=1
t
n+1ωt −
n∑
t=1
n+1−t
n+1 ωt =
n∑
t=1
2t
n+1ωt −
n∑
t=1
ωt
= n
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
(
2t
n+1
)
(ωt)−
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
ωt
)(
1
n
n∑
t=1
2t
n+1
)]
which is the sample covariance, multiplied by n, between the series { 2tn+1}nt=1505
and the series {ωt}nt=1. As 2tn+1 is increasing in t while ωt is decreasing in t, the
sample covariance is non-positive. Therefore,
n∑
i=1
κi[v;µ] ≤ 0.
If v is super-additive, then v(∅) = 0 and v is monotone, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) if
S ⊂ T (cf Megiddo, 1988). Let
∆1 =
∑
T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n− |T |)! ∑
i∈T
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)],
∆2 =
∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)! ∑
i 6∈Z
[
v(Z ∪ i)− v(Z)].
Note that ∆1 equals∑
T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T )− ∑
T 6=∅
∑
i∈T
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T \ i)
Z=T\i
=
∑
T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z 6=N
∑
i6∈Z
(|Z|+ 1)!(n− |Z| − 1)!v(Z)
=
∑
T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|+ 1)!(n− |Z|)!v(Z),
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and ∆2 equals∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)! ∑
i 6∈Z
v(Z ∪ i)− ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)!(n− |Z|)v(Z)
T=Z∪i
=
∑
T 6=∅
(|T | − 1)!(n− |T |+ 1)! ∑
i∈T
v(T )− ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)!(n− |Z|)v(Z)
=
∑
T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n− |T |+ 1)!v(T )− ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)!(n− |Z|)v(Z).
Thus, ∆1 −∆2 equals∑
T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!(2|T | − n− 1)v(T ) + ∑
Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)!(n− 2|Z| − 1)v(Z)
= n!(n− 1)v(N)− ∑
T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z 6=N,Z 6=∅
(|Z|)!(n− |Z|)!v(Z)
T=N\Z
= n!(n− 1)v(N)− ∑
T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(T )− ∑
T 6=∅,T 6=N
(n− |T |)!(|T |)!v(N \ T )
= n!(n− 1)v(N)− ∑
T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!
[
v(T ) + v(N \ T )
]
≥ n!(n− 1)v(N)− ∑
T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(N)
= n!(n− 1)v(N)−
n−1∑
t=1
∑
|T |=t
(|T |)!(n− |T |)!v(N)
= n!(n− 1)v(N)−
n−1∑
t=1
n!v(N) = 0.
Finally, when µ is the benchmark distribution for the Shapley value,
n∑
i=1
κi[v;µ] =
∆1
(n+ 1)!
− ∆2
(n+ 1)!
=
∆1 −∆2
(n+ 1)!
≥ 0
for the super-additive v.
A10. Proof of Theorem 8
Using γi[v;µ] and λi[v;µ] in the proof of Theorem 3,
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T3i
p|T |(1− p)n−|T |[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
− ∑
T3i
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |+1[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
= (2p− 1)∑
T
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |[v(T )− v(T \ i)].
By Theorem 3, α = 2p− 1. Finally, by (6),
ψ˜i[v;µ] = (1− (2p− 1))
∑
T3i
p|T |(1− p)n−|T |[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
+(1 + (2p− 1)) ∑
T3i
p|T |−1(1− p)n−|T |+1[v(T )− v(T \ i)]
= 4
∑
T3i
p|T |(1− p)n−|T |+1[v(T )− v(T \ i)].
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A11. Proof of Theorem 10510
As the ordering τ has a uniform distribution over Ω, each ordering has a
probability 1n! . Moreover, there are (|Ξτi |)! permutations in Ξτi and (n−1−|Ξτi |)!
permutations in N \ Ξτi \ i, the set of elements preceded by i in the ordering τ .
Thus, the probability of Ξτi = T is
(|Ξτi |)!(n−1−|Ξτi |)!
n! =
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n! . Using the
double expectation formula, we have
E[φ˜τi ] = E
[
E[φ˜τi | Ξτi ]
]
=
∑
T 63i
Prob(Ξτi = T )E
[
φ˜τi | Ξτi = T
]
=
∑
T 63i
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n!
n!(P
T
+P
T∪i)
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)!
[
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
=
∑
T
(P
T
+ P
T∪i
)
[
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
=
∑
T
P
T
[
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]+∑
T
P
T∪i
[
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
Z=T∪i
= λi[v;µ] +
∑
Z
P
Z
[
v(Z)− v(Z \ i)]
= λi[v;µ] + γi[v;µ] = ψi[v;µ].
The above proof already implies (9). For the Shapley value, let us apply (4)
with η = 0,
n!P
Ξτ
i
∪i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n!
(|i∪Ξτi |)!(n−|i∪Ξ
τ
i |)!
(n+1)!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
1+|Ξτi |
n+1 ,
n!P
Ξτ
i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξ
τ
i |)!
(n+1)!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n−|Ξτi |
n+1 .
For the unbiased Shapley value, the right-hand side of (11) is
4E
{
E
[
(|Ξτi |+1)(n−|Ξτi |)
(n+1)(n+2) [v(Ξ
τ
i ∪ i)− v(Ξτi )] | Ξτi
]}
= 4
∑
T 63i
Prob(Ξτi = T ) E
[
(|Ξτi |+1)(n−|Ξτi |)
(n+1)(n+2) [v(Ξ
τ
i ∪ i)− v(Ξτi )] | Ξτi = T
]
= 4
∑
T 63i
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n!
(|T |+1)(n−|T |)
(n+1)n+2) [v(T ∪ i)− v(T )]
Z=T∪i
= 4
∑
Z3i
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|+1)!
(n+2)! [v(Z)− v(Z \ i)] = Ψ˜i[v].
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Table 2: Multivariate Shapley Value and its Percentage (in Parenthesis)
Variable R-squared Squared t-stat Abs t-stat MSE: MSE:
dynamic static
Ei,t−1 0.00331*** 390.90*** 19.630*** 0.0044*** 0.0073***
(42.31) (48.67) (29.39) (17.01) (27.26)
Ei,t−2 0.00040* 29.64 5.066* 0.0035** 0.0025*
( 5.15) ( 3.69) ( 7.58) (13.57) ( 9.45)
Wi,t 0.00057* 59.76* 7.578** 0.0009 0.0009
( 7.27) ( 7.44) (11.35) ( 3.50) ( 3.34)
Wi,t−1 0.00010 12.15 3.088 0.0009 0.0009
( 1.34) ( 1.51) ( 4.62) ( 3.31) ( 3.50)
Wi,t−2 0.00002 1.79 1.056 0.0021* 0.0019*
( 0.20) ( 0.22) ( 1.58) ( 8.30) ( 6.95)
Ki,t 0.00212*** 215.47*** 14.424*** 0.0048*** 0.0048***
(27.15) (26.82) (21.60) (18.69) (17.78)
Ki,t−1 0.00077* 55.28* 5.914* 0.0025* 0.0025*
( 9.85) ( 6.88) ( 8.85) ( 9.68) ( 9.30)
Ki,t−2 0.00020 12.93 2.821 0.0026** 0.0022*
( 2.53) ( 1.61) ( 4.22) (10.15) ( 8.19)
Yi,t 0.00015 11.70 3.126 0.0007 0.0007
( 1.86) ( 1.46) ( 4.68) ( 2.57) ( 2.58)
Yi,t−1 0.00012 9.60 2.568 0.0011 0.0012
( 1.54) ( 1.20) ( 3.84) ( 4.47) ( 4.42)
Yi,t−2 0.00006 4.03 1.517 0.0023* 0.0019*
( 0.81) ( 0.50) ( 2.27) ( 8.76) ( 7.23)
***: 15% or more; **: 10-15%; *: 5-10%
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Table 3: Unbiased Multivariate Shapley Value and its Percentage (in Parenthesis)
Variable R-squared Squared t-stat Abs t-stat MSE: MSE:
dynamic static
Ei,t−1 0.00319*** 387.57*** 19.591*** 0.0038*** 0.0064***
(43.07) (48.85) (29.43) (19.79) (30.80)
Ei,t−2 0.00036 28.70 5.026* 0.0023** 0.0018*
( 4.91) ( 3.62) ( 7.55) (12.12) ( 8.49)
Wi,t 0.00057* 60.92* 7.617** 0.0010* 0.0010
( 7.70) ( 7.68) (11.44) ( 5.05) ( 4.61)
Wi,t−1 0.00011 12.62 3.121 0.0006 0.0007
( 1.47) ( 1.59) ( 4.69) ( 2.94) ( 3.25)
Wi,t−2 0.00002 1.88 1.072 0.0014* 0.0012*
( 0.22) ( 0.24) ( 1.61) ( 7.26) ( 5.92)
Ki,t 0.00201*** 212.08*** 14.370*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***
(27.07) (26.73) (21.59) (20.78) (19.20)
Ki,t−1 0.00068* 52.39* 5.814* 0.0017* 0.0017*
( 9.18) ( 6.60) ( 8.73) ( 8.96) ( 8.41)
Ki,t−2 0.00017 12.26 2.775 0.0018* 0.0015*
( 2.33) ( 1.55) ( 4.17) ( 9.36) ( 7.04)
Yi,t 0.00013 11.61 3.121 0.0004 0.0005
( 1.82) ( 1.46) ( 4.69) ( 2.29) ( 2.38)
Yi,t−1 0.00011 9.53 2.565 0.0007 0.0008
( 1.49) ( 1.20) ( 3.85) ( 3.72) ( 3.78)
Yi,t−2 0.00005 3.82 1.498 0.0015* 0.0013*
( 0.73) ( 0.48) ( 2.25) ( 7.74) ( 6.12)
αˆ -.227 -.111 -.057 -.508 -.477
***: 15% or more; **: 10-15%; *: 5-10%
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Table 4: Trichotomized Marginal Gain, Loss and Effect in the Non-Randomized Data
(U,M,E) Frequency v(U,M,E) Marginal Marginal Marginal
Gain Loss Effect
(-1,-1,-1) 1 5.4173 -11.1971 -11.1971
(-1,-1,0) 2 -5.7798 -11.1971 4.29880 -3.44920
(-1,-1,1) 2 -1.481 4.29880 4.29880
(-1,0,-1) 12 -7.8986 6.97910 6.97910
(-1,0,0) 15 -0.91951 6.97910 -4.31830 1.33040
(-1,0,1) 4 -5.2378 -4.31830 -4.31830
(-1,1,-1) 0 .
(-1,1,0) 0 .
(-1,1,1) 2 4.7123
(0,-1,-1) 1 -4.1197 1.64230 1.64230
(0,-1,0) 5 -2.4774 1.64230 -4.82210 -1.58990
(0,-1,1) 8 -7.2995 -4.82210 -4.82210
(0,0,-1) 45 -2.9165 3.63000 3.63000
(0,0,0) 133 0.7135 3.63000 3.34890 3.48950
(0,0,1) 51 4.0624 3.34890 3.34890
(0,1,-1) 4 -4.6898 2.13620 2.13620
(0,1,0) 8 -2.5536 2.13620 -1.00840 0.56390
(0,1,1) 4 -3.562 -1.00840 -1.00840
(1,-1,-1) 2 2.6511 -0.53780 -0.53780
(1,-1,0) 1 2.1133 -0.53780 -4.87170 -2.70480
(1,-1,1) 1 -2.7584 -4.87170 -4.87170
(1,0,-1) 13 -2.4809 5.72810 5.72810
(1,0,0) 13 3.2472 5.72810 -1.05760 2.33530
(1,0,1) 9 2.1896 -1.05760 -1.05760
(1,1,-1) 1 -8.0136 9.74190 9.74190
(1,1,0) 2 1.7283 9.74190 -0.21330 4.76430
(1,1,1) 1 1.515 -0.21330 -0.21330
Total 340 259 258 338
Weighted 3.04517 2.58613 2.7995
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